Isabelle CôtéWhile the global population continues to grow, over forty countries and territories are seeing their population decline, either due to out-migration (e.g., Eastern Europe and various small island nations), low fertility rates (e.g., Japan and South Korea), or high death rates due to ongoing conflict (e.g., Ukraine and Russia). But since 2022, China has also belonged to that exclusive –if unfortunate— club. What makes China stand out, however, is that the country is on the cusp of experiencing population decline “on a scale and at a speed the world has never seen”.
Chinese demographic decline
Peaking at 1.42 billion in 2022, the Chinese population has since declined by 7.69 million people (losing in the process its status as the world’s most populous country to India). That figure may seem modest given the size of the Chinese population, but it is the equivalent of the total population of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba combined. The longer-term trend is equally sobering, with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences not ruling out a scenario in which China’s population could fall to just 525 million by 2100.
Two demographic trends capture the scale and the speed of those transformations: 1) the drastic drop in birth rates from about 14.57 to 5.63 per 1,000 people in 2025 –roughly the same level as in 1738, when China’s population was only about 150 million; and 2) the rapid aging of the population, with 23% of the population being 60 years old or more, and another 300 million –roughly the size of the US population— set to leave the workforce over the next decade.
The Chinese government has elevated such dual population pressures to a national security issue. References to “population security” now appear in the party-state’s development strategies, with leaders calling for measures to assist the “development of a high-quality population.” Since 2013, Beijing has walked a tightrope between loosening restrictions on its infamous One-Child Policy, introducing the Two-Child Policy and then the Three-Child Policy in 2021, and implementing various economic and social incentives, such as the gradual rollout of free preschool and the new 13% tax placed on contraceptive drugs and condoms.
But these policies have, to date, failed to reverse the demographic decline in China, and the country runs the risk to “get old before it gets rich”, a scenario with profound ramifications for its economic development, PLA recruitment, and broader political stability.
As a result, the proverbial “carrots” could soon turn into “sticks” if birthrates do not increase, or at the very least, if they continue to decline so precipitously. Should population growth become a hard security issue, more authoritarian approaches to increasing birth rates are possible, which could then threaten China’s progress on individual rights and gender equality.
(Re) distribution of the population over the country
Compounding these issues is the recent relaxation of China’s hukou system –i.e., the household registration system implemented in 1958. Initially designed to slow out-migration from rural, inland China to the coastal urban areas, the man-made restrictions did not strictly curb urban migration, and resulted in the creation of three types of internal migrants: 1) permanent migrants with hukou residency rights; 2) migrants without hukou residency rights; and 3) temporary migrants—the latter two groups forming the so-called “floating population,” estimated at 177 million workers in 2025. Lacking urban hukou, rural migrants were often unable to access public education and healthcare, had to pay more for social services, and were often barred from buying property in the city.
In response, the State Council of China unveiled in 2024 an ambitious five-year plan to overhaul its hukou system. Chief amongst these were measures meant to integrate rural migrants into urban economies –especially in so-called ‘small cities’ of less than 3 million people— in an attempt to boost the country’s ailing economy and spur urban economic growth.
But challenges of infrastructure, resources, and social resistance loom large. For local officials, the hukou system has been a tool to manage population size and maintain social order, ensuring that resources are not stretched too thin. Shifting away from this model would require a fundamental rethinking of local governance and resource allocation, which may not be welcomed by all. Moreover, urban residents may view rural migrants as competitors for jobs and resources, potentially stirring social tensions that could undermine the reform’s objectives. This is particularly concerning in an environment where economic opportunities are not expanding quickly enough to absorb the influx of new residents.
As the case of China makes painfully clear, government policies meant to regulate the size, composition, and distribution of a country’s population carry with them important security implications for the country itself, as well as for its neighbors and trade partners. Whether they are pro or anti-natalist, or whether they facilitate or restrict the relocation of its population over its territory, such policies are doomed to have ripple effects on the country’s economy, political stability, and national security. It is best to keep a close eye on any demographic changes of the magnitude of those recently experienced by China.
Mark Pablo
Isabella Aung
Rubiat Saimum
Joao Victor Borba
Rachel Dion